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COMMENTS AND CAVEATS ON THE WIRE TAPPING
CONTROVERSY
RICHARD 0. DONNELLYt
A RECENT and carefully documented study of wire tapping concluded that
although it "is a crime in almost every state, and although there is a federal
law prohibiting the interception and divulging of the contents of telephone
communications, wire tapping is carried on virtually unimpeded in the United
States today."' This state of affairs is the culmination of many years of wire
tapping history. Except for a one year interlude during World War I, wire
tapping was a common practice both in and out of government until 1924
when Attorney General Stone banned tapping by the FBI as "unethical
tProfessor of Law, Yale Law School
1. Wkestin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: Ap; Analysis and a Legislalfve Proposal,
52 Coi. L. REv. 165, 167 (1952). As a basis for his conclusion Westin summarizes
the edsting state of affairs as follows:
"A wealth of collected information discloses that the conversations of
public officials in every sort of government agency, bureau, and political
subdivision have been tapped. Reports are legion that private citizens have
had their conversations recorded. All kinds of business organization and
social, professional, and political groups have been listed as victims. There
are charges that wire tapping may be an essential part of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's population-wide 'loyalty' probe. And recently complaints
have been made that telephones of United Nations delegates and employees
are under surveillance, as well as the telephones of foreign embassies, lega-
tions, and missions in the United States.
"It is not always public officers who use wire tapping to secure information
in cases involving kidnapping, murder, narcotics peddling, espionage and
the like; telephone monitoring is frequently used by private persons for pur-
poses as diverse as labor espionage and assuring a wife's domestic fidelity.
Sometimes the tapping is done by government agencies, by Congressional
or state legislative committees, or by rival political administrations. Some-
times tapping of conversations is done by law firms or corporations, and
the art is certainly a stock-in-trade of innumerable private detective offices.
To facilitate this wire-tapping industry, training centers for instructing tele-
phone tappers have been set up across the country under various sponsur-
ships. Private persons possess, use and even advertise the availability of the
instruments necessary for wire tapping."
The legal literature on wire tapping is quite extensive. For other porceptive dis-
cussions see Helfeld, A Study of Justice Department Policies on Wire Tapping, 9 L%%,'.
GuILD REv. 57 (1949); Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 32 Cor,'U. LQ. 514;
33 Coaw.u L.Q. 73 (1947); Comment, Wfiretapping and the Congress, 52 IfIca. L
REv. 430 (1954); Note, Congressional Viretapping Policy Overdue, 2 ST,.% L Rw.
744 (1950). Also see Fairfield & Clift, The Wiretappers, The Reporter, Dec. 23, 1952,
p. 8; Jan. 6, 1953, p. 9 .
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tactics."'2 The Stone policy continued in the Department of Justice until
1931 when Attorney General Mitchell announced that the Department would
approve wire tapping when requested by the director of the bureau con-
cerned.3 For the next nine years the Department of Justice countenanced
wire tapping but only in criminal cases of "extreme importance" and never
"in minor cases nor on Members of Congress, or officials, or any citizen
except where charge of a grave crime had been lodged against him."' 4 Finally,
in 1940, after the Department had lost three test cases 5 under Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act, Attorney General Jackson announced
a return to the Stone policy of 1924 forbidding wire tapping by the FBI.
"Under the existing state of the law and decisions," Jackson concluded, wire
tapping "cannot be done unless Congress sees fit to modify the existing
statutes."6 But this policy of prohibition lasted for less than a year. In March,
1941, in a letter to the House Judiciary Committee urging the adoption of
pending wire tapping legislation, Attorney General Jackson reversed himself
with the pronouncement that the "only offense under the present law [Sec-
tion 605] is to intercept any communication and divulge or publish the same.
Any person, with no risk of penalty, may tap telephone wires . . . and act
upon what he hears or make any use of it that does not involve divulging or
publication."
'7
This interpretation of Section 605, which is the present position of the
Department of justice, was once described by a congressional committee as
2. Statement of Attorney General Jackson, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1940, P. 1, col. 3,
reprinted in full in 86 CONG. Ric. App. 1471-2 (1940).
In 1918 the Government seized the telephone and telegraph systems and prohibited in
broad terms all wire tapping. "That whoever . . . shall, without authority and without
the knowledge and consent of the other users . . . tap any telegraph or telephone line"
should thereby commit a federal offense. 40 STAT. 1017 (1918). This statute expired by
its own terms when control was returned to the private owners in July, 1919. 41 STAT.
157 (1919).
3. Jackson statement, supra note 2.
4. Ibid.
5. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) ; Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S.
321 (1939) ; Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). See Westin, mgpra note 1,
at 177.
6. Jackson statement, supra note 2.
7. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1941).
Mr. Rogers attributes this 1941 reversal to "a confidential Presidential directive of
May 21, 1940." Rogers, The Case For Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 795 (1954).
That President Roosevelt ever established the present policy has been challenged. Hel-
feld, supra note 1, at 60 n.34; BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN 170-2 (1951). The
1941 statement of President Roosevelt, which Mr. Rogers cites, was an expression of
views in response to a bill to authorize wire tapping. This endorsement of a bill to
legalize limited wire tapping suggests quite plainly that the President did not consider
wire tapping legal in the absence of permissive legislation. Congress did not follow the
President's suggestion that legislation be adopted. His advocacy cannot reasonably be
construed as an authorization to the Department of Justice to disregard Congress-an
authorization he had no power to make.
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"strained and overtechnical." S It makes two postulates. First, since the Sec-
tion uses the terms "intercept .. .and divulge or publish," both events must
occur before there is a violation.9 Second, the entire Federal Government,
or at least the Department of Justice, is an entity. Therefore, an investigator
does not "divulge or publish" when he passes wire tap information on to his
associates and superiors inside the Government. 0 Apparently, only a dis-
closure to the world at large constitutes divulgence or publication.
There are a number of holes in the Department's argument. The Supreme
Court in the first Nardone case 11 stated that "the plain words of Section
605 forbid anyone, unless authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone
message, and direct in equally clear language that 'no person' shall divulge
or publish the message or its substance to 'any person.' "' The only judicial
support for the Department's position came in the 1950 dictum of Judge
Reeves in the Washington Coplon case.13 In the New York Coplon case,
on the other hand, both Judge Ryan 1 4 and Judge Learned Hand 1 indi-
cated that interception alone is unlawful. Furthermore, the Department's
interpretation ignores the provision of Section 605 which enjoins the "use"
of intercepted communications for anyone's benefit.Y' Obviously, without
either divulging or using, wire tapping would be just an idle pastime.' T
S. Sax. REP. No. 2700, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
9. Wilful and knowing violations of § 605 are punishable by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or by imprisonment for a term of not more than two years or both. 43 ST,%T.
1100 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §501 (1946). Section 605 has been construed to impose a civil
as well as criminal liability. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F,2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
10. Attorney General Biddle stated that to prohibit divulgence was n~ot to prohibit
an investigator from reporting to his superiors. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1941, p. 4, col. 2
11. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
12. Id. at 3,2. Also see United States v. Gruber, 39 F. Supp. 291, 294 (S.D.N.Y.
1941) ("As to the words 'divulge or publish,' I cannot conceive that this refers only to a
divulgence in court. The section prohibits divulgence or publication 'to any pers,,n...:
The [phrase] 'any person' in the section means exactly what it says, 'any person.").
13. United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C. 1950), rezd on other
grounds, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
14. United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 921, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1950): "The fact that
these interceptions were carried on under written authorization of the Attorney General
imparts no sanctity to them; they remain unlawful and prohibited."
15. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950) : "It is of course well-
settled law that 'wiretapping' is forbidden by statute; and that evidence obtained by a
federal officer in violation of law may not be used against the victim of the violation."
16. "[A]nd no person having received such intercepted communication... shall...
use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or the benefit of
another not entitled thereto. . . ." 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 05 (1946).
The Supreme Court has yet to be presented with a prosecution for using intercepted
data. In Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 12-, 125 (1942), Loth the majourity
and dissenting opinions indicated that the "use for benefit" prohibition wvas applicable to
the Government, its officers, and private persons, and that a violation is punishable as a
crime under § 501. Also see Helfeld, supra note 1, at 64 n.60.
17. See note 20 infra.
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Other federal agencies do not share the Department of Justice's inter-
pretation of Section 605. The Treasury Department, for instance, takes the
position that wire tapping itself is prohibited,18 and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission assumes that since Section 605 prohibits the "use" of in-
formation gained by wire tapping, this, in effect, bars any wire tapping.10
Faced with a conflict among interested agencies, it is strange that the De-
partment of Justice has never sought a court test of its position in a proceed-
ing where the question could be squarely raised, i.e., a criminal prosecution
of a wire tapper.2 0  This failure can perhaps be explained, in part, by a
reluctance to prosecute citizens for illegal practices utilized by government
agents rather than by any genuine belief in the soundness of the Department's
interpretation of Section 605.21
Apart from technical objections to the Department's position, its validity
is denied by the basic policies which the Supreme Court has ascribed to
18. See Note, 2 STAN. L. REv. 744 (1950), referring to a letter from the Under
Secretary of the Treasury. Even though the Treasury Department does not tap, it has
shown considerable resourcefulness in utilizing other electronic devices not proscribed by
§ 605. See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (walkie-talkie radio);
United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480 (D.D.C. 1953) (recording of conversation
between informer and suspect).
19. Statement of James L. Fly, Chairman of FCC, to House Judiciary Committee,
88 CONG. Rzc. APP. 288 (1942). See also, statement of Chairman Hyde of the Federal
Communications Commission in Hearings before Subcotinittee No. 3, House Comnmitte
on the Judiciary on H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, HR. S149, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 44
(1953).
20. In the summer of 1950, when public opinion forced the Department of Justice to
proceed against wire tappers in the District of Columbia, the grand jury failed to indict.
A congressional investigating committee described this failure as follows:
"The attorneys presenting the case were of the view that unless 'divulgence'
of information obtained from wire tapping could be shown, . . .no crime
could be made out, though your subcommittee feels that reasonable men could
quite well conclude that such wire tapping was hardly engaged in without
some divulgence or other use or benefit being made of the information ob-
tained of it." SEN. REI. No. 2700, op. cit. mipra note 8, at 5.
There appears to be only one reported case in which the Department prosecuted a
violation of § 605. United States v. Gruber, 39 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y.) (motion to quash
indictment and suppress evidence denied), appeal denied, 123 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941).
Gruber, an attorney for a client under investigation by the SEC, had induced an SEC
switchboard operator to plug him in on calls which affected his client's interests. But this
case was not a test of the Department's interpretation, since the defendants had divulged
the information.
21. In one instance Attorney General Jackson ordered the United States Attorney
for Rhode Island to drop an investigation of wire tapping violations, and the Department
reported that it "could not 'in good conscience' prosecute the wire tappers because the
federal investigators had themselves used wire tapping." Westin, supra note 1, at 169
n.18.
Even if wire tapping alone does not violate § 605, it still violates the criminal statutes
of 38-odd states. Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 73; Westin, supra at 181. Moreover,
eavesdropping was an indictable offense at common law, 4 Bi Comm. 168 (1890), and
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Section 605, and which Congress has never repudiated. In the first Arardone
case, Justice Roberts, adopting the spirit of the Holmes and Brandeis dis-
sents in Ohnstead v. United States,2- formulated these policies:
"Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders
should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to
methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive
of personal liberty. The same considerations may well have moved
the Congress to adopt § 605 as evoked the guaranty against practices
and procedures violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments of the Constitution."23
Section 605 thus confers a statutory right of privacy that is equated with
the constitutional right of privacy conferred by the Fourth Amendment.
Hence, wire tapping is analogous to an unreasonable search and seizure. The
argument that telephone privacy is invaded only by interception and di-
vulgence is as fatuous as an argument that Fourth Amendment privacy is
invaded only when there is an unreasonable search and seizure and the use
of the evidence so obtained in court. Rather the "divulge or publish" pro-
vision of Section 605 has the same effect on wire taps as the doctrine of
Weeks v. United States,2 4 barring the use of illegally secured evidence, has
on unreasonable search and seizure. They are exclusionary rules which
supplement civil and criminal sanctions 2 as means of protecting the right
to privacy.
Except as a revealing index to the attitudes and predispositions of the
chief investigative and enforcement arm of the Federal Government, the
Department of justice's interpretation of Section 605 is of little assistance
in indicating the direction in which reform should move. Its position does
make it clear that the existing situation is intolerable and that the confusion
over wire tapping will be resolved only when clear and comprehensive legis-
lation is enacted.
Since the first Nardone decision in 1937, nearly 40 bills, resolutions, and
joint resolutions dealing with wire tapping have been introduced in Congress.
Most of them would have authorized limited wire tapping by federal officials
is still punishable as a statutory offense in some states. Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 530.
As a common law offense, eavesdropping by wire tapping might be considered within the
following provision of the District of Columbia Code:
"Whoever shall be convicted of any criminal offense not covered by the
provisions of any section of this code . . . shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than five
years, or both." D.C. CoDE § 22-107 (Ann. 1951).
22. 277 U.S. 438, 449, 471 (1928).
23. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937).
24. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
25. The civil and criminal sanctions against an illegal search and seizure are collected
by Justice Frankfurter in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n.1 (1949). For similar
sanctions against wire tapping see note 9 supra, and Rosenzweig, mupra vote 1, at 73.
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and permitted the use of the results in evidence in federal courts.20 The
bills proposed in the present Congress are basically similar to those of pre-
vious years. 27 Attitudes regarding this legislation depend upon which one of
two opposing points of view is embraced. On the one hand, there is the
belief that wire tapping should be banned completely and effectively, and
that legislation to that end should be adopted. The other approach would
authorize limited wire tapping and would prohibit unauthorized taps.
THE VIEW THAT ALL WIRE TAPPING SHouLD BE BANNED
This point of view starts with the assumption that wire tapping is an
invasion of privacy that cannot be controlled within authorized limits." 8
Unlike a search and seizure, which is circumscribed by the provisions of the
Fourth Amendment,2 9 a wire tap cannot be specific in its quest for evidence
nor confined to matter relevant to crime. It is an exploratory dragnet. It is
usually carried on continuously for months on end. It is non-selective and
indiscriminate as to whom it "searches" and what it "seizes." 0 In the Coplon
26. See Comment, 52 MIcE. L. REv. 430, 436 (1954).
27. See H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
Hearings, supra note 19. H.R. 477 was reported favorably to the full committee. Before
the full committee, Congressman Keating, the author of H.R. 477, proposed an amend-
ment to his original bill. This was adopted by the full committee and ordered reported
in the form of a clean bill, H.R. 8649. See H.R. REP. No. 1461, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1954). See Rogers, supra note 7, at 792 n.1.
28. This position was first stated in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United
Stafes, 277 U.S. 438, 475-6 (1928) :
"Whenever a telephone is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends
of the line is invaded and all conversations between them on any subject,
and although proper, confidential and privileged, may be overheard. More-
over, the tapping of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the
telephone of every other person whom he may call or who may call him.
As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but
puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tap-
ping."
See the Murphy dissents in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 125 (1942), and
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) ; and the dissents of Justices Frank-
furter and Douglas in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758, 762 (1952).
Senator Joseph McCarthy has apparently endorsed this view. In the current Army-
McCarthy Investigation, he branded the monitoring of telephone conversations as an "in-
decent and dishonest" practice. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1954, p. 10, col. 8.
29. For the restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment, see Reynard, Freedom
from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 IND.
L.J. 259 (1950); Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects: A Rule
in Search of Reason, 20 U. oF Cal. L. REv. 319 (1953).
30. E.g., "In the course of tapping a single telephone, a police agent recorded con-
versations involving, at the other end, the Julliard School of Music, Brooklyn Law School,
Consolidated Radio Artists, Western Union, Mercantile Commercial Bank, several restau-
rants, a drug store, a real estate company, an importer, many lawyers, a stationery store,
a dry cleaner, numerous bars, a garage, the Prudential Insurance Company.... ." Westin,
supra note 1, at 188 n.112.
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case, 3 ' for example, the FBI recorded talks between the defendant and her
mother, a quarrel between a husband and wife who had no connection with
the case, and conferences between the defendant and her lawyer.32 The FBI
also learned about an affair, altogether unrelated to espionage, between Miss
Coplon and a Justice Department lawvyer. 33
Surely legislation permitting invasions of privacy of this magnitude is justi-
fiable only by great necessity, and the burden of establishing this necessity
should be upon the proponents. The proponents of limited wire tapping assert
that it is a necessary and important investigative method for the detection and
prevention of serious crimes.34 And we have the word of Attorney General
Brownell that the Justice Department has evidence against "several people
who have betrayed the United States" who cannot be prosecuted because of
the ban on wire tap evidence.33 The proponents also argue that tapping "is
no worse, when used by proper officials and pursuant to adequate safeguards,
than is the use of informants, decoys, dictaphones, peeping, and the like--
all of which have been accepted practices for many years."3 0
But this necessity argument proves too much. It shows the operation of
Gresham's law in law enforcement. It substantiates Edmond Cahn's point
that one of the important symptoms of "the current atavistic period" is the
growing conviction that the process of government must necessarily be a
31. United States v. Coplon, 83 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
32. For the substance of the interceptions, see id. at 926. Also see, Report on crtain
Alleged Practices of the FBI, 9 LAw. GtUiLD Rev. 185, 195 (1949).
The interception of telephone communications between attorney and client was held to
violate Fifth Amendment due process and Sixth Amendment right tt counsel. 191 F24
749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
33. BARTH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 173.
34. The House Judiciary Committee recently stated its views regarding the need for
legislation:
"The existence of an international conspiracy to destroy our form of
government is so notorious that it needs no comment. The fact that the
agents of this conspiracy are dedicated solely to the overthrow of our
Government by force and violence and are engaged in the commission of
such crimes as espionage, sabotage, treason, and other subversive crimes,
is patent. The records of our criminal courts substantiate the accuracy of
that statement...
"Here are subversive zealots, dedicated to a cause hostile to the very
existence of our Government, who are expertly trained to operate within
the confines of our country, in secrecy and stealth. They are equipped with
the latest technological equipment that science can devise to further their
work....
"Our Nation needs today, more than ever, every weapon it can use to
destroy those who seek to destroy it. The immunity which the present law
gives to these spies and traitors in using a telephone conduit to carry their
plans of intrigue and subversion must be stopped" H.R. Rr'. No. 1461, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 5 (1954).
35. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1953, p. 10, col. 4.
36. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 793-4.
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"dirty business," unrestrained by moral considerations.3 7 It runs counter to
the principle of our society that the goal of efficiency in law enforcement is
subordinate to the preservation of personal liberty. Occasionally, this prin-
ciple frustrates the true interests of justice by releasing the guilty. But this
kind of self-denial on the part of government is an essential characteristic of
a free society. Although limited wire tapping may help the FBI bring spies
and saboteurs to heel, similar assistance could be expected from opening the
mails and practicing the third degree. And, no doubt, a great deal could be
learned by placing recording devices in confessionals, in physicians' consulting
rooms,38 and in lawyers' offices. But a society that countenances these tech-
niques ceases to be free.
Nor does it appear that wire tapping is always a necessary and important
investigative method. The Government frequently claims that wire tapping
does not yield information of any probative value.30 In the Coplon case, in
which extensive taps were made, the Government convinced Judge Ryan
that the proof to be offered at the trial was independently obtained by other
methods of investigation.40 And J. Edgar Hoover, in 1940, characterized
wire tapping as an "archaic and inefficient" practice which "has proved a
definite handicap or barrier in the development of ethical, scientific, and sound
investigative techniques." 41
Proponents of wire tapping legislation assert that law enforcement officers
would use the limited power wisely. Mr. Rogers, for example, says there is
little to fear since the Attorneys General have authorized "relatively few
interceptions ... in the past." 42 The joker here is the expression "relatively
few." Since there are millions of telephones in this country, the 170 taps
admitted by Mr. Hoover to have been in existence on January 15, 1950,
41
would probably be considered "relatively few." And while the police may
37. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 29 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 473, 481 (1954). Also see Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952).
38. J. Edgar Hoover has stated that physicians should report to the FBI any facts
relating to espionage, sabotage, or subversive activity which come to their attention. "The
physicians of America, like other citizens can best help in the protection of the nation's
internal security by reporting immediately to the FBI any information of this nature
which might come into their possession." Hoover, Let's Keep America Strong, 14 J.
Am. MED. Ass'N 1094, 1095 (1950).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Weinberg, 108 F. Supp. 567, 569 (D.D.C. 1952);
United States v. Flynn, 103 F. Supp. 925, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); BARTH, op. eit. supra
note 7, at 156-170; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1221 (1952).
40. See United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 921, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
41. Letter to the Harvard Law Review, dated Feb. 9, 1940, quoted in 53 HARv. L.
REv. 863, 870 n.53 (1940).
42. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 798.
43. Department of Justice Press Release, Jan. 15, 1950, quoted in EFmasox & HADER,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 220-1 n.10 (1952). Attorney Gen-
eral Brownell recently told a Senate Judiciary subcommittee that wire tapping operations
have reached as many as 200 at a single time since 1941, and that in total they have run
into the thousands. N.Y. Times, April 21, 1954, p. 18, col. 1.
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attempt to exercise self-restraint, the influence of power corrupts even the
best intentions.
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under-
standing."4
THE Vmw THAT LIMITED WIRE TAPPING SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED
In the various committee hearings between 1937 and 1941 on proposals
to authorize wire tapping, the proponents were generally from the Depart-
ment of Justice. The opponents usually represented various civil liberties
and labor groups.4 5 Iost of the opposition disappeared under the stress of
World War II and has failed to reappear during the "cold war."4' 0 It is not
unlikely, therefore, that legislation authorizing wire tapping will soon be en-
acted.4 7 But legislation committing this nation to a policy of limited wire
tapping should be adopted only after careful study and investigation. 5 To
accommodate the conflicting claims of national security and individual pri-
vacy, this legislation should (1) specify a limited number of situations in
which wire tapping will be permitted, (2) prescribe definite procedures for
obtaining permission to wire tap, and (3) impose effective sanctions upon
unauthorized wire tapping.
Wire tapping should be restricted to the investigation of a few serious
crimes such as treason, sabotage, and espionage.49 Other "national security
or defense" offenses that are essentially sedition laws, such as the Smith
44. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
45. See Comment, 52 Micn. L. REv. 430, 433 (1954).
46. Id. at 438 n.53. In the most recent hearings on wire tapping legislation, both the
Americans for Democratic Action and the American Federation of Labor endorsed limited
wire tapping. See the statements of John J. Gunther, Legislative Representative, Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action, and Andrew J. Biemiller, National Legislative Committee,
American Federation of Labor, in Hearings, supra note 19, at 57, 65. But the ADA ap-
parently reversed its position in the Senate Hearings, and opposed even limited wire tap-
ping. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1954, p. 32, coL 1. The American Civil Liberties Union and the
National Lawyers Guild also opposed limited wire tapping. Hearings, supra note 19, at 53,
60. The ACLU, however, realizing that legislation is likely, suggested elaborate safeguards.
47. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 792 n.l.
43. For suggestions as to the scope of such an inquiry, see Helfeld, A Study of the
Jistice Departmet Policies On Wire Tapping, 9 LAw. GLUW REv. 57, 63 (1949);
Westin, supra note 1, at 200; Comment, 52 MIcH. L. Rav 430, 441 (1954) ; Note, 2 STA::.
L. Ra-v. 744,750 (1950).
49. The results of this restricted wire tapping should be admissible in evidence only
in the prosecution of one of the specified crimes. Any other disclosure or use should be
prohibited. H.R. S649, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), permits the use in evidence of au-
thorized taps "in any criminal proceedings in any court established by Act of Congress,
but only in criminal cases involving any of the foregoing violations:' For the broad
category of "violations," see note 51 infra.
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Act,r0 should not be included.ri Sedition laws affect the political process
and the range of suspected violators during a time of wild accusations and
denunciations is enormous. At a period when the protections afforded to
those who question society's values are already sharply curtailed, wire tap-
ping is no weapon to turn loose in the area of political, social, and economic
beliefs.
Even in the investigation of the limited class of crimes enumerated, strict
and definite procedural safeguards should be observed before wire tapping is
authorized. Although the Department of Justice insists that the Attorney
General should have the exclusive authority to permit wire taps, judicial con-
trol is an essential safeguard. The Attorney General is obviously an in-
terested party and should not be charged with policing his own investiga-
tions.5 2 Otherwise, if the FBI asserts that "national security" is at stake,
permission is likely to be accorded automatically. It would be interesting to
know whether the Attorney General under present practice has ever turned
down an FBI request.
Since wire tapping, like a search and seizure, is a governmental inquiry
into the privacy of an individual's affairs, it requires the supervision of the
courts. The power to issue ex parte orders authorizing wire tapping should
be deposited in the federal judiciary. These orders should be issued if the
Attorney General's application shows (1) probable cause to believe that one
of the specified crimes has been committed or is about to be committed, (2)
probable cause to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the solu-
tion of such crime, or which may prevent its commission, and (3) that there
are no other means readily available for obtaining such information.
50. 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1951).
51. H.R. 8649, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), permits wire tapping upon the express
written approval of the Attorney General and "in the course of any investigation to detect
or prevent any interference with or endangering of ... the national security or defense
... by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy, violations of chapter
115 of title 18 of the United States Code .... violations of the Internal Security Act of
1950 ... , violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 . . . , and conspiracies involving
any of the foregoing." Chapter 115 of title 18 covers the crimes of treason, misprision of
treason, rebellion or insurrection, seditious conspiracy, and advocating overthrow of
Government. It also deals with certain offenses affecting the armed services.
52. Cf. Statement of Miles McDonald, Hearings, supra note 19, at 71, 80:
"Mr. McDonald. I think prosecutors, myself included, can be overzealous;
and I think you sometimes get to a point where you have pretty good sus-
picion, but no evidence, and you want to rush in and get a wiretap. You
think you will solve everything with a wiretap and you are inclined to do
it; it is a shortcut.
"I think someone who was disinterested in the success of the prosecution
ought to be a safeguard that will go in and say, 'You have not got enough.'"
53. This follows rather closely the New York procedure. See Westin, supra note 1,
at 203, and the statement of Miles F. McDonald, District Attorney of Kings County,
Brooklyn, N.Y. in Hearings, supra note 19, at 71-91.
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The Department of Justice opposes court control for several reasons.54
First, wire tapping requires a high degree of secrecy, and leaks can best be
avoided by placing it under the control of the Attorney General. Second,
uniformity in authorization is necessary, and this would be jeopardized if
several hundred federal judges could issue court orders. Third, speed is
essential and the time consumed in obtaining a court order might result in
the loss of important evidence. With the possible exception of lack of uni-
formity, these fears have not materialized in New York where wire tapping
is permitted pursuant to an ex parte court order.r5 And lack of uniformity
would gradually disappear as the courts worked out the criteria for determin-
ing the meaning of "probable cause." Furthermore, it is not necessary that
every federal judge be granted the power to issue wire tapping orders. Since
permission to tap would be requested in "relatively few" cases, the authority
might be limited to the federal judges in the District of Columbia 0 or to
judges designated by the Chief Judge of each circuit.
Finally, limited wire tapping legislation should effectively interdict un-
authorized tappingY7 The first step is to remove the ambiguities in Section
605: it should be made clear that the act of wire tapping is illegal. Moreover,
wire tapping should be redefined. Section 605 uses the term "intercept," and
narrow judicial construction has held that telephone conversations picked up
on a detectaphone were not intercepted. 8 The placing of a recording device
54. See Statement of William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, in Hcarings,
supra note 19, at 4, 5.
55. See Statement of Miles McDonald, in Hcarings, supra note 19, at 71-91.
"M. KEATiNG. But so far as leakages in the court are concerned, have you
ever had any bad experience?
M. McDoxA. Never." Id. at 82.
56. Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure limits the power to issue
a search warrant to the district wherein the property sought is located. Weinberg v.
United States, 126 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1942), indicated that Art. III, § 2, of the Con-
stitution and the Sixth Amendment require such a limitation on a district court's p wer.
"Though these [constitutional] provisions refer to the trial, no one has yet
attempted to separate process from trial and make the former e.xtend beyond
the district." Id. at 1006.
On the other hand, an arrest warrant may be served an)where in the United States,
Rule 4(c) (2), thus modifying the former practice under which a warrant could be served
only within the district where issued. Mitchell v. Dexter, 244 Fed. 926 (1st Cir. 1917).
And under Rule 17(e) a subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness may be served
anywhere in the United States.
57. Criminal sanctions for unauthorized tapping are not the only methods of control.
Section 552-a of the New York Penal Law, recognizing the extreme difficulty of appr-
hending the wire tapper as he is tapping a line, makes the possession of wire tapping
equipment by private persons and unauthorized public officers a crime. And for the recom-
mendation that the Federal Communications Commission be empowered to make rules
and regulations governing wire tapping, and also be granted certain investigative and en-
forcement powers, see Westin, supra note 1, at 207.
58. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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on one end of the line has also given the federal courts some trouble. 0 And
it is not clear whether the use of an induction coil is an interception. 60 Wire
tapping should be defined in such a way as to include all possible devices and
techniques for invading wire privacy by listening to the contents of a tele-
phone message.
CONCLUSION
It is by no means clear that the proponents of limited wire tapping have
shown its necessity. But even if the view that all wire tapping should be
banned prevails, new legislation is needed because Section 605 is inadequate.
On the other hand, if the limited wire tapping position is accepted, it is
essential that wire tap investigations be limited to a few serious crimes, that
the results be admissible in evidence only in the prosecution of these crimes,
that court authorization of tapping be required, and that the public be
afforded realistic protection against unauthorized wire tapping. The bills
proposed in the current session do not meet these standards.
59. Compare United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940), with United
States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480 (D.D.C. 1953).
Following the Polakoff case the Federal Communications Commission in 1947 issued
a regulation requiring that every telephone-recorder attachment, when in operation, must
emit a "beep" warning signal over the wires each fifteen seconds. Today, with the pro-
duction of telephone recorders thriving, there are at least a hundred thousand in active
use, mostly in private industry but a substantial number in government. Less than ten
per cent of these-the Bell System's most recent figure is eight thousand-give the re-
quired "beep." Fairfield & Clift, supra note 1, at 8, 12.
A related problem arose in the Army-McCarthy Investigation. There, the dispute
was whether or not stenographic reports of telephone conversations could legally be
presented to the congressional committee for its consideration. N.Y. Times, April 25,
1954, § 1, p. 1, col. 1 ; § 4, p. 1, col. 7.
60. In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 1.99 (1952), the Supreme Court assumed with-
out deciding that use of an induction coil constituted an interception, but held that § 605
was not intended to ban wire tap evidence in state courts.
Most writers agree that Congress has power to regulate the use of wire tapping evl-
dence in state as well as federal courts. Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 77; Notes, 34 ILL.
L. REv. 758, 760 (1940) ; 40 J. Cmam. L. & CIMINOLOGY 476, 481 (1949) ; 25 MINN. L.
REv. 382, 384 (1941). This problem should be considered in drafting wire tapping legis-
lation. See Comment, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 430 (1954).
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